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Ibizagate: Capturing a Political Field in Flux 
 
In May 2019, Austria was engulfed in arguably the biggest scandal since the Waldheim-
Affair1 of 1986. Now known as “Ibiza”, this revolved around then Vice-Chancellor and head 
of Austria’s Far-Right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Heinz-Christian Strache. 
Undercover video-recordings had been made available to, and reports published by, 
journalists writing for the German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung and the weekly newsmagazine 
Der Spiegel. The video-recording showed Strache and his FPÖ-colleague Johann Gudenus in 
a villa on the Spanish island of Ibiza nearly two years previously, in July 2017, in 
compromising conversations with a woman posing as a Russian oligarch’s niece. The secret 
recording revealed discussions about potential favors Strache was apparently willing to offer 
in exchange for possible, hidden financial support2 and the pretend-oligarch’s niece’s possible 
(partial) “take-over” of Austria’s most widely-read newspaper. Unbeknownst to them, Strache 
and Gudenus had walked into a trap that revealed deep contradictions between the FPÖ’s self-
styled image as an anti-corruption, anti-establishment party and the lengths to which Strache 
and Gudenus were seemingly prepared to go, or at least to entertain, in the pursuit of power.   
The ensuing fallout has changed Austria’s political landscape. When the scandal 
broke, shortly before the European elections, Austria was governed by a coalition between the 
center-right People’s Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ. In less than18 months, this government had 
moved issues associated with the FPÖ’s nationalist agenda to the center of its policy remit. 
Such issues included asylum and its discursive tying to questions of security and criminality,3 
immigration and integration, and attempts to resist further European integration or undo some 
of its existing manifestations.4 Concurrently, individual FPÖ-politicians had made news with 
xenophobic outbursts or their documented proximity to Far-Right civil-society associations.5 
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) had, on several occasions, struggled to maintain his party’s 




coalition with a partner that showed no qualms about such entanglements. In the wake of 
breaking news about Strache’s secretly recorded conversations on Ibiza, this proved no longer 
possible. Within hours, Strache and Gudenus had resigned. Within days, the coalition was no 
more. Soon thereafter, Kurz’s attempt to continue as Chancellor ended abruptly following the 
Second Republic’s first successfully passed vote of no confidence in parliament, initiated by 
the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and, remarkably, supported by the FPÖ that had only just left the 
coalition. These most extraordinary days in recent Austrian history saw a new-found 
popularity enjoyed by Federal President Alexander Van der Bellen6 who steered Austrian 
politics through these unprecedented circumstances. Van der Bellen credited the 
Constitution’s for providing the necessary guidance and nominated a “care-taking” 
government comprised of experts and high-profile civil servants until snap-elections in late 
September 2019. With 37.46 percent of the vote, Sebastian Kurz emerged from those once 
again victorious, the SPÖ dropped to 21.18 percent, the FPÖ suffered massive losses (i.e. 
16.17 percent, compared to 25.97 percent two years previously), whilst the Greens (13.9 
percent) secured their return to parliament and the liberal, pro-European NEOS increased their 
share of the vote to 8.1 percent. In January 2020, the ÖVP and the (unambiguously left-
leaning) Greens formed Austria’s next coalition government.7  
This sketches the contours of events in Austria after May 2019, but the fall-out of the 
Ibiza-Affair went further. Not only did it temporarily end two political careers, namely 
Strache’s and Gudenus’, it also triggered a series of subsequent, related revelations. 
Investigations into the people behind (Hintermänner) the recording continue at the time of 
writing. The electoral “hit” – on regional, national and European levels – taken by the FPÖ 
has been formidable, although not as large as some had predicted. In the months since the 
scandal broke, it has featured prominently in Austrian political discussion and media 
discourse. This article traces the fault-lines that emerged or deepened in the aftermath of the 




scandal(s) and through the various argumentative positions adopted by a range of actors 
debating and pronouncing on the issue. What follows is not an attempt to establish a definitive 
verdict of what happened on Ibiza, its illegality and consequences. At the time of completing 
this article, the scandal is the object of a parliamentary enquiry, and the full facts of the matter 
are far from established. Instead, this analysis offers a Foucauldian reading of a still unfolding 
scandal and the discursive field of competing positions, to which it has given rise. Analysis of 
the various truth-claims formulated in this contested discursive field reveals dynamics that are 
partly (re)shaping Austria and the self-understandings of key-actors implicated.  
The argument unfolds in successive steps. A summary of the theoretical genealogy, on 
which this article draws, is followed by historical contextualization and by outlines of the 
corpus of data underpinning this discussion and the analytical strategy driving it. The main 
sections document competing argumentative positions that have shaped, and continue to 
shape, the discursive field that has opened up in the aftermath of the Ibiza-scandal. By reading 
those positions as competing truth- and identity-claims in their wider contexts, a novel 
perspective on contemporary Austria, and more narrowly on the (shifting) discursive positions 
represented by prominent actors in her public domain becomes possible.   
 
Contexts: theoretical, historical, methodological    
 
Conceptually, this discussion builds on I, Pierre Rivière, in which Michel Foucault and his 
colleagues examine the competing discourses and implicated truth claims – made by medical, 
psychiatric and legal actors – surrounding the 1835 trial of Pierre Rivière. The latter stood 
accused of murdering his mother and siblings, before taking flight and being apprehended 
near his village in Normandy. Drawing on a range of documents (e.g. court transcripts, police 
reports etc.), Foucault et al.8 demonstrate how the establishment of “the facts” surrounding a 




gruesome crime implicated diverse actors and institutions vying for hermeneutical hegemony 
in a contest over truth, responsibility, and the institutionalized authority to define both. I, 
Pierre Rivière is most relevant to criminologists and historians of the French criminal justice 
system, medical and psychiatric professions during the nineteenth century. At closer 
inspection, however, this book combines Foucault’s earlier archaeological and later 
genealogical approaches9 to trace “truth games” encountered in a specific institutional nexus 
shaped by broader political and discursive forces.    
 Paul Brass subsequently developed Foucault’s approach further. In Theft of an Idol,10 
Brass subjects violent episodes recorded in Uttar Pradesh, India, to an analysis that takes its 
cue from I, Pierre Rivière. In each case examined (i.e. including rape and the theft of a 
religious idol), Brass demonstrates that “the facts at hand” were elusive. Adjusting the 
analytical vector, his intention is not to declare what happened or who the perpetrators of 
violence were; instead, Brass unpicks the political work performed through the claims made 
in the aftermath of violence. Brass analysis uncovers that the interpretative struggles over the 
alleged, competing “truths” surrounding the incidents in question reveal the intentions of the 
enunciating speakers rather than the actual chronology of, or responsibility for, what 
happened. Various local actors, including politicians, had stakes in pushing specific 
interpretations, in the absence of firm knowledge of the underlying facts. In a context of 
heightened communalism, the ensuing interpretative struggles allocated blame to a predefined 
“other”, polarized populations along religious lines, and pursued electoral benefits from such 
boundary-entrenchments. Geographically closer to the present article’s empirical focus, Pieter 
Judson11 has made a similar argument. In relation to “village violence” in the late imperial 
period, Judson shows how nationalist preoccupations with drawing ethno-linguistic 
boundaries within heterogenous populations came to frame local conflicts along the Habsburg 
empire’s “internal language frontiers” from the late nineteenth century onwards. 




 Turning to our narrower context, the darkest chapters in Austrian history, World War 
II and the Holocaust, are famously well-researched, as are post-war continuities of anti-
Semitic sentiments and exclusionary politics.12 Key-themes in the well-covered terrain of 
Austria in the post-1945 era include: the political opportunism of a quickly sedimented 
“victim myth”,13 which would be challenged by wider acceptance of “co-responsibility”14 for 
the events of 1938-1945 only decades later; coupled to the growing hegemony of a new 
identity narrative of “Austrian particularism” in juxtaposition to the pan-Germanic self-
understandings that had dominated Austrian politics hitherto.15 The country’s post-war 
challenges included the punishment of war criminals and the question as to how to deal with 
more than 500,000 former Nazi party-members. Following steps toward “de-Nazification” 
during the early post-war years, later amnesties were part of a for decades largely 
unproblematized re-absorption of former Nazis into the fabric of Austrian society.16 The two 
major political parties, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP), had a stake 
in speaking to all segments of society, as part of their post-war politics of Proporz and 
consensual democracy.17 At the same time, parts of the “third camp”, often compromised 
through previously closer ideological and organizational entanglements with Nazism, were 
soon re-organized: initially through the Verband der Unabhängigen and, as of 1956, through 
the FPÖ as its successor.18 Whilst the (earlier) history of the FPÖ saw the party fluctuate 
between liberal- and (pan-Germanic) nationalist fractions, Jörg Haider’s rise to the party’s 
apex in 1986 marked a definitive shift toward the (Far-)Right.19 In the following decade-and-
a-half, against a backdrop of far-reaching shifts and changes in and beyond Austria,20 the 
FPÖ’s election returns improved steadily, particularly though not only at the SPÖ’s expense.21 
Combining anti-establishment rhetoric with nationalist protectionism that opposed migration 
and multiculturalism, Haider found ever-growing audiences throughout the 1990s. The FPÖ’s 
rise to power and international attention unfolded in the aftermath of the 1999 elections. The 




party’s inclusion in a coalition with the ÖVP, under Wolfgang Schüssel, led to temporary 
“sanctions” put on Austria by her then 14 EU partners and to vocal civil society opposition in 
Austria.22 The compromises required by its new-found position of power led to tensions 
internal to the FPÖ, and eventually to its splitting, in 2005, into the Haider-led Bündnis 
Zukunft Österreich23 and the “old” FPÖ, which was henceforth led by Heinz-Christian 
Strache. Whilst Austria returned to successive grand coalition governments between the SPÖ 
and ÖVP, Strache moved the FPÖ further to the right, (re-)mobilizing growing segments of 
the electorate through campaigns that spanned EU-skepticism and Islamophobia.24 Against 
the backdrop of the “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016,25 this strategy bore fruit at the 2017 
national elections, leading to the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition-government mentioned earlier.  
 The contexts thus set, the corpus of data to be examined below needs to be outlined 
next. I draw on a main body of materials collected between the start of the Ibiza-Affair, 
marked by the publication of the video-clip on the websites of the Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
Der Spiegel on 17 May 2019, and Strache’s expulsion from the FPÖ on 13 December 2019. 
Whilst the latter event constituted an undeniable milestone – and one that, in narrative-
structural terms, contained elements of a classical fall from grace, as seen from Strache’s emic 
perspective26 – it did not mark the scandal’s endpoint. As mentioned, the issues unearthed and 
follow-on scandals triggered by the Ibiza-Affair are a long way from being resolved, the 
“facts” by no means fully clarified. Investigations continue, as do the debates they have 
triggered. However, in the spirit of the Foucault-inspired genealogy of research summarized 
above, the extensive materials collected between May and December 2019 offer insights into 
competing discursive-political positions that are (re)shaping Austrian political discussion 
today; some such positions long pre-existed the scandal; others have been reconfigured in the 
course of it; yet others amount to novel argumentative positions. Jointly, they reflect a shifting 
discursive-political field in a period of pronounced crises. The main data corpus was 




complemented by additional materials collected between the scandal’s one-year “anniversary” 
in May 2020 and the early stages of the parliamentary enquiry that commenced the following 
month. Such additional data reflect further, still unfolding shifts in public debate surrounding 
the issues raised by “Ibiza”. While emerging discursive positions and trajectories are 
highlighted below, no end to the shifts triggered by the scandal is in sight. Instead, the events 
since May 2019 reveal, when viewed through the analytical framework applied here, the 
constitutive tensions of a political field in flux.  
 The sources systematically researched – for coverage of the “Ibiza-Affair” throughout 
the period(s) in question – spanned much of Austria’s diverse field of media production. They 
included ideologically differently positioned quality dailies (Der Standard, Die Presse, 
Kurier); the weekly newsmagazine Profil; the Viennese, left-leaning weekly Falter; the 
tabloids Österreich and the country’s most widely-ready paper, and key-protagonist in the 
fall-out to the scandal, the Kronen Zeitung (or Krone); and coverage by Austria’s public 
broadcasting network ORF. The rationale for casting my net widely was to capture diverse 
voices articulated across a range of media with diverse (intended) audiences and political 
leanings. Another key-source was the account, published in book-form27 in August 2019, by 
the two journalists who had been given access to the undercover recordings of Strache and 
Gudenus on Ibiza28 and who were the driving forces behind the revelations.  
 Before discussing these wide-ranging data,29 my analytical strategy requires further 
commentary. In the spirit of the (post-)Foucauldian approaches outlined above, this discussion 
probes data not for “what happened” but for what is being claimed and by whom; for which 
interpretations are being offered, and for the political trajectories and strategies enabled by 
the argumentative positions being adopted. These questions demand contextualization: 
understanding competing claims and interpretations on offer since May 2019 requires us to 
read them against the backdrop of the longer (Austrian) histories summarized earlier. What 




follows is structured thematically (rather than chronologically): the discussion unfolds around 
competing truth claims and argumentative positions that have shaped the discursive field that 
has opened up in Austria since May 2019. As in the (post-)Foucauldian lines of enquiry 
sketched earlier, the questions as to who speaks about an event and how take center-space. 
   
Heinz-Christian Strache’s shifting positions 
 
An analysis of the truth-claims formulated in the fall-out to the Ibiza-scandal must start with 
the shifting positions adopted by its central protagonist. Those can be contextualized in 
relation to Strache’s EU election-campaign prior to news of “Ibiza” breaking on 17 May 
2019. Some three weeks previously, Strache had lent his voice to the nationalist trope of a 
“population exchange” (Bevölkerungsaustausch), the conspiratorial claim that Austria is 
threatened by demographic shifts tied to migratory flows.30 Concurrently, Strache’s electoral 
posters were showing him in stateman-like posture, promising to “protect what we love: 
Austria.”31 This image and rhetoric were blatantly contradicted by the video-revelations 
published soon thereafter. Strache’s initial reactions appeared to show embarrassment, as 
conveyed – in front of international TV-cameras – during his resignation from all political 
offices, and his apology to his supporters and wife.32  
Partial regret soon gave way to outright counter-attack, as Strache’s lawyers were 
reported to have filed complaints in Vienna, Munich and Hamburg against the producers of 
the video.33 Declining to take up us his seat in the European parliament, which 45,000 
preference votes would have enabled him to do, Strache announced in mid-June that for the 
time being he would be an “ordinary party member”, awaiting the results of the investigations 
into the “background to the Ibiza-video”, determined to fight for rehabilitation, and certain 
that his political life – “always focused on Vienna and Austria” – was “not over”.34 Within 




days of his resignation, Strache had attempted – via his enormously popular Facebook page, 
which still attracted some 800,000 fans after Ibiza – to shift attention toward the “initiators” 
of the video, who had “trapped” him in a purportedly “targeted attack against Austria’s 
sovereignty.”35 As the scandal broadened, and investigations were extended to also address 
suspicions of a possibly corrupt quid-pro-quo between the FPÖ and a gaming corporation, this 
led to police raids and the temporary confiscation of Strache’s smartphone; Strache responded 
by calling this an “entirely arbitrary act” (reine Willkür) and “yet another political attack”, 
whilst his lawyer filed a complaint against the raid and called for a stop to the proceedings.36 
When soon thereafter German satirist Jan Böhmermann targeted, not for the first time, Strache 
in a televised political commentary, Strache’s response made it clear who he saw as the real 
danger: “Leftist hatred”, Strache claimed on his new, private Facebook account (after the FPÖ 
had taken control of Strache’s previous, much larger page), “goes to sickening lengths, this 
pseudo-satirist even wants to see me burn”.37   
 Overall, Strache’s recurring argumentative strategies have combined a belittling of 
what happened on Ibiza (in his words, this had been “merely”, though an admittedly 
embarrassing b’soffene G’schicht, or alcohol-induced episode) with denials of any 
responsibility, particularly through the claim – that soon circulated among his most ardent 
supporters – that Strache had “not been himself”, suggesting the conversations may have been 
brought about by drugs mixed into his drinks. The former strategy of (relative) trivialization 
appeared, for instance, in an interview with the editor of the daily tabloid Österreich: there, 
Strache said – in apparent self-contradiction – that while he was genuinely sorry for having 
witnessed the destruction of his political work, he also believed that “forgiving oneself and 
others” was important, and that he had a “clear conscience”.38 The second strategy emerged in 
claims, by both Gudenus and Strache, that they could not remember parts of the evening, 
leading them to speculate that they may have been drugged.39 In a joint interview with his 




wife, Strache also spoke of a “trap” allegedly set for him, including the “mixing of a 
substance” into his drinks, with Philippa Strache declaring that “this was not my husband, this 
was not alcohol”.40 This victimization-topos and denial of responsibility stand in contrast to 
medical experts’ assessments that found no evidence in Strache’s and Gudenus’ demeanor in 
Ibiza of any signs of “being drugged”.41 Commenting, in another interview, on the fateful 
night and the subsequent police-raid mentioned above, Strache combined several 
argumentative positions: when the police arrived to raid his home, he said, he was “still 
naked”, and professed to be “appalled and stunned” at this “act of injustice”; wondering why 
he had not been granted access to the full seven-hour Ibiza video-recordings, Strache 
speculated that the journalists in question “might want to quote out of context”, in one-sided 
fashion; he again claimed to have seen himself “act in patterns I don’t recognize”, thus 
amplifying the drugging-speculation; finally, Strache suggested that if there was no interest in 
a “genuine investigation” of the Ibiza-video, he may consider a political comeback.42     
 The conspiratorial tone of Strache’s position culminated in his speech of 1 October, in 
which he announced that he would suspend his FPÖ-membership: portraying himself as a 
victim of “slander”, “cowardly” employed by “our party’s usual opponents”, and his family as 
the “object of hatred” from which he sought protection, Strache spoke of hostilities that 
“endanger our democracy” and that – in contradiction to the earlier claim about “the usual 
opponents” – “still unknown forces had cultivated in criminal fashion for years”. Strache 
appealed to party unity, lamenting that “such dirty methods for manipulating elections … 
must not win out”.43    
 This statement had multiple intended audiences, including Strache’s supporters and 
FPÖ-colleagues. What the Foucauldian approach applied here enables is not a definitive 
pronouncing over the relative (in)accuracy of competing truth claims but a recording of the 
political positions they enable, of the shifting allegiances, oppositions and self-presentations 




they transport, and the rhetorical-argumentative means they employ. The immediate question 
thus arises how effective Strache’s calls for “party unity” were.  
 
The FPÖ: from gradual detachment to (irrevocable?) rupture 
 
A month prior to the most recent European elections, and three weeks before the Ibiza-
revelations, comparative research suggested that among Europe’s (far-)rightwing populists the 
FPÖ could rely on the largest share of committed voters (as opposed to fickle “protest-
voters”), namely some 14 percent of Austria’s electorate.44 With the FPÖ polling 17.2 percent 
of the Austrian vote a month later, compared to 19.72 at the previous elections to the 
European parliament in 2014, this relative strength arguably still endured despite Ibiza. Yet, 
subsequent months were to test the FPÖ profoundly. 
 As observed in Austria’s weekly newsmagazine Profil,45 the FPÖ’s immediate 
strategy for handling the breaking scandal was to employ its long-tested tactics of 
conspiratorial “perpetrator-victim reversals”,46 threatening legal steps against purportedly 
“dirty methods”; yet, the party soon realized that counter-attack would prove ineffective given 
the scale of the revelations, and that resignations would be unavoidable. Attempts to deflect 
still continued. The video-revelations had suggested that the FPÖ may have used a network of 
associations or think-tanks to channel undeclared funds toward the party. At the end of May, 
the FPÖ, though it disbanded two such associations, bemoaned what it called a “media witch-
hunt” (mediale Hetzjagd) and declared that “no direct or indirect donations” had reached the 
party through those channels.47 In an interview published in Falter, Norbert Hofer – Strache’s 
successor at the FPÖ’s helm – was then still ambivalently semi-protective of his predecessor, 
explaining why Strache had not (yet) been expelled from the FPÖ: Hofer argued that the 
potential quid-pro-quos discussed by Strache, as recorded in the Ibiza-video, had not taken 




place; and although the party was “concerned”, Hofer repeated Strache’s defensive account 
that he was “not like this” and that “something may have been mixed into his drink”; further, 
Hofer argued that Strache had not been expelled since this would have “torn the party apart” 
and because of Strache’s “life-time achievements” for the FPÖ.48 When, in late August, the 
scope of the investigations49 was narrowed, as suspicions of bribery seemed not to have been 
substantiated at this point, FPÖ general secretary Harald Vilimsky considered Strache and 
Gudenus to be at least partly “exonerated”.50     
 Concurrently, the FPÖ’s tone about Strache was shifting. By July, Strache and the 
FPÖ were arguing over control of Strache’s Facebook-page, leading Hofer to claim that the 
importance of the latter was “completely over-estimated”.51 The subsequent, already-
mentioned suspicions over possible corruption implicating Strache, some of his colleagues 
and a high-profile appointment for the international gambling company Novomatic were 
recognized as posing yet more “explosive” questions for the FPÖ.52 With Austria’s snap-
elections approaching, the situation was exacerbated by allegations against Strache, involving 
a former secretary and bodyguard, of financial mis-spendings.53 Yet, on the eve of Austria’s 
parliamentary elections, Norbert Hofer posted a Facebook-video, in which he rhetorically tied 
the “Ibiza-trap” (set by “criminal organizations”) to the more recent timing of revelations of 
Strache’s alleged financial improprieties, postulating a “political attack against Austrian 
democracy”.54 On 29 September, the political price of preceding events to the FPÖ became 
apparent, as the party’s share of the vote – at 16.17 percent – constituted a minus of almost 10 
percent compared to the 2017 elections.   
Eventually, a rupture between Strache and his former colleagues in the party he had 
led for fourteen years became inevitable. As the months following the initial publication of 
the Ibiza-reports unfolded, one scandal had become many. Henceforth, the FPÖ’s tactical 
focus would be to draw a clear boundary between itself and its former head. Therein lies one 




of this article’s central insights: its Foucauldian approach captures the (re)drawing of political 
boundaries – accomplished by publicly articulated and circulated claims and interpretations 
pertaining to the scandal in question – “in-action”, so-to-speak. In relation to the FPÖ’s 
emerging repositioning vis-à-vis Strache, this was already apparent prior to the snap-
elections: internal party-voices acknowledged that allegations of Strache invoicing the party 
for personal expenses contradicted the image the FPÖ had cultivated, making a “comeback” 
by Strache “well-nigh impossible”.55 On 1 October 2019, the FPÖ suspended Strache’s party 
membership. Two months, further allegations of possible financial improprieties by Strache,56 
the defection of three Viennese FPÖ-councillors (and Strache-supporters) and their founding 
of a new electoral platform (Die Allianz für Österreich, DAÖ) later, Strache was expelled 
from the FPÖ on 13 December 2019. Preceding weeks had seen growing acrimony between 
Strache and his former colleagues, some due to Strache’s anger at the FPÖ’s having taken 
control of “his” former Facebook-page.57 Two weeks prior to Strache’s expulsion, former 
Interior Minister (and now party whip) Herbert Kickl declared that “there was no room in the 
FPÖ anymore” for Strache.58 With the party seeking to distance itself from all that had 
happened, the FPÖ’s new leadership presented Strache’s expulsion as a “liberation” and a 
“line drawn” (Schlussstrich) after the “Ibiza-Affair”.59   
Subsequently, following Strache’s appearance at a gathering of the newly-founded 
DAÖ, which was later renamed Team HC Strache – Allianz für Österreich and is now (under 
Strache’s leadership) the FPÖ’s direct competitor in Vienna, the FPÖ reacted with dismay. 
Dominik Nepp, head of the Viennese FPÖ-branch, criticized Strache for having “mocked” 
local functionaries’ long-standing commitment; Nepp suggested that Strache was ego-centric, 
self-pitying, incapable of admitting mistakes, and perhaps constructing a “parallel world” 
detached from reality.60 A similar, pseudo-psychiatric discourse of discrediting through the 
rhetorical use of diagnostic labels surfaced soon thereafter. The FPÖ’s electoral trouncing in 




Burgenland’s regional elections led to a blame-game between Strache and his successor via 
twitter. After Strache had interpreted the Burgenland results as suggesting that Hofer was 
making the party “irrelevant”, Hofer replied with a tweet showing an unflattering image of 
Strache, taken from the “Ibiza-video”, and an ironic “thank you”; the following day, the 
regional head of the FPÖ’s Tyrolean branch tweeted this “advice” for Strache: “Having partly 
caused a state crisis [and] lived at the party’s expense … [he] blames others. No sign of regret 
… The only things that may help are a psychiatrist or an exorcist.”61      
The Ibiza-scandal has implicated a wide range of actors. Turning to another (set of) 
player(s) in the affair, the tabloid Kronen Zeitung, Paul Brass’s62 focus on “competing 
frameworks of meaning” in the struggle over politically charged episodes bears repeating: 
each (re)construction constitutes an “artifact” with a distinctive “life” and “[t]he most useful 
function the social scientist can perform … is to identify the uses to which a construction is 
put and the power relations … expressed through it.”  
 
The Kronen Zeitung: ideological realignment?  
 
Austria’s most popular newspaper found itself a central topic in the undercover recordings of 
Strache’s and Gudenus’s conversations with the purported oligarch’s niece on Ibiza. The 
book-length account by the investigative journalists from the Süddeutsche Zeitung whose 
reporting on the video was key to the revelations contains the following passages related to 
the Kronen Zeitung:  
 
[T]he conversation moves to what Johann Gudenus calls the “main topic”: the Kronen 
Zeitung … The woman whom the two FPÖ-politicians know as Aljona Makarowa 
allegedly wants to buy half the tabloid … and align it with the FPÖ … Strache is 




electrified: the Krone is Europe’s “most powerful paper proportional to population 
size” … “Importantly”, Strache explains, “we have friendly access … to the shares 
held by the Funke-group” … Strache suggests that if the Russian bought the 50 
percent held by [the heirs of the paper’s founder] Dichand, schwupp, “then you have it 
all.” … The Russian’s chaperon chimes in: the paper’s journalists would be divided … 
into those already in line, … those who can be brought in line … and others to be 
sidelined. Strache nods, “journalists are the planet’s biggest prostitutes anyway” … 
“Once she takes over the Kronen Zeitung … we must sit down [zusammenhocken] and 
talk … Zack, zack, zack”, he would “push” three or four people, bring in five new 
ones, three or four others “would go” [abserviert werden].63 
 
This requires context. The partial ideological overlaps between the Krone and Austria’s New 
Right have frequently been commented upon. Ruth Wodak64 argues that the paper had already 
“celebrated” the FPÖ’s electoral performance four days before the controversial elections of 
1999, which would see the party’s share of the vote increase to 26.9 percent. Pointing at areas 
of convergence (i.e. an anti-immigration stance; the neoliberal paradigm; critique of political 
elites), Michael Rittberger65 has argued that Jörg Haider’s success would have been “hard to 
imagine” without the Kronen Zeitung’s (implicit) endorsements. Yet, notwithstanding the 
paper’s consistent leanings toward a populism skeptical of European integration and 
dismissive of the benefits of migratory flows or of the likelihood of a mutually enriching 
multi-culture, it is misleading to reduce the Krone to an unfaltering or singular ideological 
position: its pages, positions and much-discussed readers’ letters also contain occasional shifts 
or examples of “counter-discourse”.66  
This raises the question as to how the Kronen Zeitung, a core-focus of Strache’s 
attention in his will to power, responded to such phantasies of a “take-over”. While a full 




exploration, including of readers’ responses to Ibiza on the “letters-to-the-editor” pages, 
exceeds the scope of this article, an indication of the Krone’s responses to the scandal can be 
gleaned from its acting editor-in-chief’s daily commentary on current affairs. Arguably, 
(growing) ambivalence toward the FPÖ was already discernible on 24 April 2019, when 
Klaus Herrmann questioned – in light of a xenophobic outburst by an FPÖ deputy mayor from 
Upper Austria – whether the party was a suitable coalition-partner. The day after the scandal 
broke, the paper’s headline declared that the FPÖ was “finished” (FPÖ am Ende!), expressing 
outrage at the reported plans to “buy” the paper and calling for Strache’s and Gudenus’ 
resignations.67 The day after, Herrmann described Strache’s “political suicide” and the 
scandal as Austria’s “topic of the decade”.68 One week on, the paper’s frontpage declared that 
those were “fateful days for Austria”, with the editor-in-chief reflecting on how Strache had 
wanted to “Orbanize” Austria’s media; in ironic, intertextual reference to Strache’s most 
infamous Ibiza-statement, this – so Herrmann – had “zack, zack, zack led to Strache’s 
demise”.69 Neither have critical comments been restricted to Strache. Instead, several episodes 
saw the editor’s criticisms extended to the FPÖ, thereby refusing the party’s splitting-strategy 
(i.e. Strache’s expulsion) documented above: thus, Herrmann variously amplified calls for the 
FPÖ to disclose its financing-strategies,70 suspicions of connections between the FPÖ and the 
Far-Right, radical Identitären,71 and expressed incredulity after FPÖ-politician Ursula Stenzel 
had spoken at a rally organized by the Identitären, only for the party to claim that Stenzel had 
not been “fully aware” whom she had addressed;72 similarly, Herrmann supported those 
expressing grave concern at the second reported scandal – in less than two years – triggered 
by an FPÖ-functionary’s membership in a fraternity shown to possess song-books with anti-
Semitic contents.73     
 The Kronen Zeitung’s unsurprising offence at Strache’s ideas recorded in the Ibiza-
video need not necessarily lead to an enduring ideological realignment on part of the paper. 




Some commentators have observed that the Krone has recently turned toward environmental 
issues and that, through a satirical tweet in the aftermath of the FPÖ’s trouncing in September, 
the paper seemingly claimed some influence on the election results.74 Others have doubted the 
Krone’s claims not to be the kind of tabloid Strache had planned to instrumentalize for 
electoral gain but an “independent family newspaper”.75 It was thus stressed that shortly 
before “Ibiza” the Krone had still endorsed the FPÖ’s calls for a scrapping of public 
broadcasting fees.76 Others, most notably the Falter’s editor, have been more skeptical, 
arguing that Strache’s view of the Krone as key to power was worryingly accurate; and 
predicting that “reactionary resentments” would continue to feature in the Kronen Zeitung.77    
As with much of “Ibiza”, a final word on the scandal’s long-term impact on the 
Krone’s positioning cannot yet be spoken. While it is too soon to assess the extent or 
durability of any potential distancing from positions the paper has historically shared with the 
FPÖ, it is the case that prominent voices in the latter have bemoaned what they have 
presented as a shift in the paper’s editorial steer since “Ibiza”. In November 2019, the FPÖ’s 
general secretary Christian Hafenecker published an open letter, in which he announced that 
he had cancelled his subscription to the Kronen Zeitung: this, Hafenecker argued, was due to 
the paper’s “unparalleled campaign” against the FPÖ, despite his party’s alleged 
accomplishments in “17 months of government responsibility”; the Krone’s new editorial 
tone, Hafenecker continued, departed from the “objectivity”, “independence” and “balance” 
that had underpinned the paper’s success over the preceding 60 years.78  
 Elaborating on I, Pierre Rivière, Paul Brass79 postulates that the examination of 
uneasily co-existing but mutually “interpenetrating” interpretations can enable a sharper view 
of “competing discourses, systems of thought, and relations of domination”. This becomes 
clear as we turn to interpretations of Ibiza offered by the FPÖ’s former coalition-partner and 
now again political competitor.     





The ÖVP: controlled (and contested) distancing  
 
Turning to the next group of protagonists’ voices in this drawn-out (set of) scandal(s), we 
encounter more evidence of how various “frameworks of meaning” have been employed in a 
context that has provided different actors with “opportunities to make use of [select] incidents 
for wider political purposes”.80 For the ÖVP, the dominant partner in a coalition-government 
with the FPÖ at the time the Ibiza-scandal broke, the affair has provided a similar need – and 
simultaneously possibilities – to redefine itself and its positions vis-à-vis political 
competitors. The range of the ÖVP’s argumentative stances, especially when faced with 
speculations that its potential entanglements81 might have gone beyond those of being a 
coalition-partner to the FPÖ, constitute discursive terrain that exceeds the scope of the present 
article; a comprehensive discussion will have to await future analyses and require more clarity 
than we have at present as to the details behind the affair. All that can be offered here is a 
schematic tracing of key-positions adopted by the ÖVP in the aftermath of the revelations. 
 A day after the initial publications, on 18 May 2019, Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’s 
statement and call for snap-elections were noteworthy for being simultaneously back- and 
forward-looking: 
 
“Two years ago I stepped up to accomplish change in our country. I also promised to 
articulate uncomfortable truths.” He says in recent months he had to put up with a lot 
[i.e. scandalous statements by individual FPÖ politicians], yet he pushed through. “But 
after yesterday’s video, I have to say …: enough is enough.” Hence, new elections 
were needed now, and he would like to ask Austrians for their support. Because “only 




if the ÖVP is dominant after the elections, can we continue and complete those 
changes”.82   
 
This contained several topoi – an argument’s implicit premises – and patterns of “positive 
self-presentation and negative other-presentation”83 that have been part of the ÖVP’s 
positions since Ibiza. The party’s central argument has included a justificatory strategy with 
regard to its initial decision to enter into a coalition with the FPÖ, coupled to the ÖVP’s self-
portrayal as a party of integrity in the current crisis. This was the argumentative logic behind 
Sebastian Kurz’s decision to ask for Interior Minister Herbert Kickl’s resignation very soon 
after the scandal broke; for Kickl had been the FPÖ’s general secretary at the time of the 
undercover recordings, an entanglement at odds with responsibility for overseeing 
investigations into potentially undeclared party-financing for the FPÖ; emphasizing that he 
was still “100 percent behind” the coalition’s political foci, Chancellor Kurz also insisted that 
the FPÖ had not realized “the full scale” of the scandal.84 After the parliament’s vote of no 
confidence on 27 May, Kurz85 again expressed his satisfaction with the now-collapsed 
coalition’s previous accomplishments, coupled to doubt as to whether a renewed collaboration 
with the FPÖ would be possible (i.e. Kurz contrasted Hofer to Kickl, suggesting that they 
represented different reactions to Ibiza within the FPÖ, and arguing that “time would tell” 
which strand would shape the FPÖ going forward); concurrently, reflecting the ÖVP’s general 
strategic (re)positioning, Kurz saw barely any productive connections (kaum 
Anknüpfungspunkte) with the Social Democrats, thus making a return to Austria’s long-
tradition of grand coalitions seem highly unlikely.86 A binary logic contrasting other parties’ 
reactions to Ibiza to the ÖVP’s featured in the latter’s general response to the vote of no 
confidence: ÖVP whip August Wöginger described his party as conscious of its 
responsibilities, whereas the SPÖ had acted “against the people and the Federal President’s 




will” by throwing the country – in collaboration with the FPÖ – “into chaos”;87 similarly, 
Kurz detected “vengefulness” in other parties, describing the no-confidence-vote against his 
short-lived, post-Ibiza cabinet as “incomprehensible to everyone in the country”, whilst 
reasserting the ÖVP’s commitment to stability and that all financial donations to it had been 
entirely legal88.    
 Other positions adopted by Kurz and the ÖVP have included: advice directed at 
Strache “not to return” to politics;89 closer to the elections, an ever-clearer distancing from the 
former coalition-partner, with the ÖVP’s Gernot Blümel declaring that Strache and Kickl 
were claiming a “victim-role” instead of aiding the Ibiza-investigations;90 and criticism of 
purported connections between individual FPÖ-functionaries and the Far-Right extremist 
Identitären.91 Putting clear blue water between oneself and the FPÖ had become even more 
important for the ÖVP in light of a widening of the investigations into potentially hidden 
financial donations, with the question being posed if not only the FPÖ but also ÖVP and SPÖ 
may have indirectly benefitted from some such undeclared financial flows.92 Meanwhile, 
reports that a previous employee of the Chancellor’s office had secretly had five hard-drives 
disposed of shortly after the start of the Ibiza-Affair93 led to speculations that the ÖVP may 
have known about the Ibiza-video already before its publication in Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
Der Spiegel;94 this was categorically denied by the ÖVP, with Sebastian Kurz stressing that 
disposing of data was part of any government hand-over.95 Finally, ÖVP allegations, first 
made in June, that someone had illegally accessed the party’s computer-frame and fabricated 
fake internal emails making false claims about the genesis of the Ibiza-video were seemingly 
substantiated when a suspect was identified and prosecuted in relation to this.96 Less than a 
month before the snap-elections, the ÖVP also reported a major hacking of its internal 
communications, accompanied by theft and subsequent manipulation of the stolen data, 




presumably intended to enable the circulation of false, discrediting information about the 
party.97     
 The ÖVP’s attempts to distance itself from what the Ibiza-revelations had brought to 
light about its former coalition-partner have been countered by political and journalistic 
voices suspecting that compromising entanglements (e.g. in relation to the Novomatic-issue) 
may have cut across the FPÖ-ÖVP divide. This has become pronounced in the context of the 
current (June 2020) parliamentary enquiry. Prior to its start, SPÖ-politician Jörg Leichtfried 
had called it an elucidation of – staggeringly in this order – an “ÖVP-FPÖ scandal” (türkis-
blauer Skandal).98 The FPÖ, meanwhile, now approaches the issue through a relativizing- and 
deflecting topos, the implicit, connotative sub-text of which claims that others (i.e. the ÖVP) 
are getting away with matters, for which allegedly only the FPÖ is being (wrongly) 
victimized. Before the enquiry’s start, Herbert Kickl predicted that this would reveal 
nepotistic networks and financial channels far beyond the FPÖ.99 Since then, the FPÖ’s 
attempts to white-wash itself and to shift attention toward what is portrays as a system skewed 
by its former coalition-partner have centered on accusations that the ÖVP may obstruct parts 
of the Ibiza-investigations and was even – the FPÖ here uses the conspiratorial “deep-state” 
trope – creating a “state within the state”.100  
Concurrently, other suggestions that the ripple-effects of “Ibiza” go beyond the FPÖ 
also feature elsewhere. Commenting from a very different position and taking stock of months 
of investigations into the full range of suspicions and allegations, Falter’s Florian Klenk has 
notably spoken of a political “morass” that implicates not only the FPÖ but also the ÖVP 
(türkise Sümpfe).101 In short, Ibiza-related attention has been partly (re)directed toward the 
ÖVP. This and the latter’s responses again underscore conflicting forms of political boundary-
work brought about by the scandal. The ÖVP has consistently claimed clear distance from its 
former coalition-partner. The FPÖ and, in less apparently self-interested fashion, the rest of 




the current parliamentary opposition and parts of Austria’s broadsheet press, meanwhile, have 
asked questions that blur or reject such purportedly clear distinctions and that are tantamount 
to a possible extension of responsibility beyond the FPÖ for the wider issues unearthed 
through Ibizagate.102  
In the cacophony of voices, statements and speculations about Ibiza and its aftermath, 
important space has thus also been claimed by diverse positions critical of the political status-




Full analysis of the entire range of voices critical of the former ÖVP-FPÖ coalition 
throughout the unfolding of the scandals triggered by the Ibiza-revelations exceeds the present 
article’s scope. Anticipating more work on this facet of the discursive-argumentative fault 
lines that have deepened since May 2019, all that can be offered here is a sketch of prominent 
positions and “genres” of criticism. Those have spanned journalistic insistence on 
investigating the structural and cultural conditions of possibility underpinning everything that 
has come to light since the Ibiza-revelations; calls, for instance by parts of the political 
opposition, for legislative changes pertaining to party-finances; and, at least temporarily, a 
wider – though certainly not uncontested103 – registering that Ibiza had discredited the politics 
claimed by Heinz-Christian Strache.  
 The arguably most obvious, and a much-repeated, criticism in the aftermath of the 
initial Ibiza-revelations was that Strache’s video-taped intentions flagrantly contradicted some 
of his long-professed positions. Given long-standing anxieties about the possible 
commodification of Austrian water, and the FPÖ’s opposition to any such developments,104 
Strache’s suddenly diverging thoughts recorded on Ibiza are worth quoting: 





Strache returns to the water-issue: “The water business can only be managed in such a 
way that we, as the state, take our white gold into the state-owned domain, and then 
hire someone who manages this in the private-sector.” And there the Russian could 
enter the equation.105      
 
Der Standard,106 for one, was quick to show that whatever the details of Strache’s 
contemplations, they flew in the face of the FPÖ’s programmatic stance against any 
privatization of water, which Strache had asserted consistently since 2007.  
As the scandal unfolded into a succession of interconnected scandals, critical 
journalistic voices had much to comment on: some questioned the parliament’s vote-of-no-
confidence at the very moment Sebastian Kurz had apparently learnt that a coalition with the 
Far-Right was impossible;107 others – rejecting Strache’s and the FPÖ’s attempts to deflect 
and portray themselves as “victims of an intrigue” – thanked the investigative journalists at 
Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung for revealing an “attack on democracy” and a “betrayal 
of Austrian citizens”.108 Obermaier and Obermayer themselves, when interviewed in Profil,109 
amplified voices rejecting Strache’s belittling-attempts by reasserting that he and Gudenus 
had repeatedly brought up the topic of the Kronen Zeitung; that Strache had needed no 
prompting to discuss possible government-contracts for the purported oligarch’s niece; and 
that the latter’s assumed wealth had been the main topic of discussion. Some cautioned voters 
against falling for the FPÖ’s later strategy (à la René Girard) of reclaiming the party’s self-
ascribed integrity by scapegoating Strache only.110 Yet others warned against any splitting 
strategies – following the Federal President’s declaration that Austrians were not as depicted 
by two of the country’s politicians in the Ibiza-video – that effectively projected deep-seated 
issues exclusively onto Strache and Gudenus: chauvinistic machismo, it was argued, recurred 




across the spectrum, as did a susceptibility to potential corruption; further, Strache had been 
recorded describing undeclared financial flows benefitting political parties, against which 
Austria’s transparency activists had warned for years.111 In the immediate aftermath of 
Ibizagate, the country’s smaller parties Jetzt, NEOS and the Greens had already asked for a 
strengthening of the audit office’s ability to check parties’ finances and organizational 
networks.112 In due course, there were further calls that Ibiza had revealed the need for more 
stringent legislation pertaining to the financing of political parties.113  
Also noteworthy was a commentary by two lawyers defending the alleged mastermind 
behind the video-recordings:114 concerned by the fact that some media had shifted attention 
away from what had been said on Ibiza and toward the question of the legality of its 
publication, the lawyers argued that their client had shown civil disobedience in the public 
interest by uncovering plans or at least a willingness to alter Austria’s media-landscape and 
encourage hidden party-financing that threatened democracy.115 As this discussion has shown, 
the ripple-effects of the initial revelations had spread far and wide, including, for instance, the 
Falter’s investigations into how the ÖVP, especially though not only, had exceeded its 2017 
campaign-spendings.116 By the end of the year, there were indications that the effects of Ibiza 
were manifesting beyond the predictable circle of political actors and journalistic 
commentators. When the country’s “word”, “infamous word” and “infamous phrase of the 
year” were decided by a sample of 7,500 participating Austrians, the wider resonance of 
Ibizagate crystallized: “Ibiza” emerged as “word of the year”, Strache’s belittling description 
of what had happened as a  fairly harmless “piss-up” (b’soffene G’schicht) as the year’s most 
infamous word, and the above-mentioned “zack, zack, zack” as 2019’s infamous phrase.117 
Few critical voices have commanded as prominent a place as Florian Klenk, chief-
editor of Falter and the first Austrian journalist to see the full Ibiza-recordings already prior to 
the revelations in Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel. When called as the first witness to 




the parliamentary enquiry in June 2020, Klenk dispelled Strache’s defense while also placing 
the scandal in its wider context: Klenk thus declared that the published extracts had, contrary 
to Strache’s oft-repeated claims, not been taken out of context; and that the video showed 
Strache not intoxicated but engaging in a “corruption-dance” that painted a disconcerting 
picture of the abuse of power in Austria.118 Elsewhere, Klenk reflected on what had become 
fragmented, politically polarizing Ibiza-investigations involving two ministries, two 
departments of public prosecution, and – in the early stages – an investigator who was a 
member of the ÖVP and a documented Strache-sympathizer; the result, Klenk argued, were 
sometimes incoherent investigations, in which questions about the making of the video 
threatened to overshadow the larger corruption-related issues, and which called for political 
reforms.119 Armin Thurnher, Klenk’s colleague at Falter, went so far as to argue that “Ibiza” 





Profil described “Ibiza” as a “scandal that has changed Austria”. Opposing Strache’s 
relativizing strategy and self-ascribed martyr-status, the newsmagazine continued thus: 
  
This video was no fiction, and certainly not the b’soffene G’schicht, into which 
Strache keeps trying to remould it … Much would have remained hidden without the 
video’s publication: Strache’s plans for the betting industry, for the Kronen Zeitung, or 
the FPÖ’s network of associations. The video revealed the deep chasm between 
portraits of the FPÖ as a clean party fighting for ordinary people against the 
establishment and Strache’s real ambitions, his unscrupulous privileging of personal 




over national interests … His vision for Austria’s media-landscape oriented itself 
toward the Hungarian model.121   
 
The run-up to, and the early stages of, the parliamentary enquiry have seen significant further 
developments. Strache’s dual-strategy of admitting to embarrassing behavior whilst denying 
any wrong-doing and claiming a victim-status for himself has continued. The FPÖ’s 
estrangement from its former head has reached new extremes, with Herbert Kickl declaring 
that Strache was now “even more stupid than a year ago”.122 Concurrently, the FPÖ especially 
but the current opposition more generally have sought to enlarge the circle of culprits for the 
structural problems unearthed to implicate the ÖVP. The now unfolding parliamentary 
enquiry has indeed seen growing animosities between the current government of ÖVP and 
Greens on one hand, and the opposition comprising SPÖ, FPÖ and NEOS on the other.123 The 
variously drawn, contested or blurred boundaries, and hence the narrow attribution or 
expansive deflection of responsibility respectively, are the quintessential issues at stake in the 
discursive-political field that has opened up since the start of Ibizagate. At the same, the 
number of voices calling for far-reaching institutional reforms now required, in light of what 
has been discovered since May 2019, are growing steadily.124    
This discussion has built upon Foucault and his colleagues’ I, Pierre Rivière: there, as 
in the Ibiza-scandal, different subject positions, individual and collective, map onto 
competing regimes of truth.125 Of course, the respective foci and units of analyses lie far 
apart: Foucault et al. revealed the contested inter-relationship between psychiatry and criminal 
justice in the mid-nineteenth century; the present case-study, conversely, has unearthed a 
multiplicity of “discordant”, yet mutually astutely aware and competing voices and “narrative 
frameworks”126 articulated in the aftermath of Austria’s biggest recent political scandal. In 
both cases, a cacophony of competing truth claims makes seemingly straightforward 




questions as to what is “true or false undecidable”.127 Approaching the issues and materials in 
hand through such a binary lens would miss the point. Instead, settings such as the one 
examined above allow a different form of examination: one focused on the “construction and 
flow” of competing knowledges; read in their respective contexts, and nowadays profoundly 
shaped by the echo-chambers of our digital age, such competing knowledges acquire yet 
greater methodological relevance as a means for “decipher[ing] the relations of power, 
domination and contest”, in which discourses materialize.128  
 On the level of post-fact interpretative struggles, events in Austria since May 2019 
have resonated with the (post-)Foucauldian insights summarized earlier. Foucault traced “a 
case, an affair, an event” that came to be (re)constructed multiple times, in the “intersection[s] 
of discourses” of various “origin[s], form[s], organization and function”; this revealed “a 
confrontation … through discourses … used as weapons of attack and defense in the relations 
of power and knowledge.”129 Similarly, though closer to the context at hand, Pieter Judson has 
revealed how – in the late-imperial period – “messy events” along the Habsburg empire’s 
internal language-frontiers were seized upon by nationalist activists and the press; “disputed 
chains of events” were thereby given a nationalist gloss, “endowed with propagandistic value 
by linking them to … larger narrative frameworks”.130 The point is not that nothing had 
happened, it had; but its alleged meanings were constructed, claimed, contested and 
disseminated after the fact.   
When applied to the Austrian contests examined above, such an approach can capture 
a political field in flux, and trace its constitutive and shifting fault lines and divisions. Once 
again, nationalist frameworks of meaning have played key-roles, but certainly not the only 
ones, as this discussion has shown. In some ways, the fall-out of the Ibiza-Affair can be read 
as at least a temporary shift away from the nationalist hegemony that was in the process of 
crystallizing before the scandal broke.  




Such a constructivist take does not mean that the facts behind the affair cannot or will 
not be discovered, let alone that they should not be revealed. The Austrian public deserves 
nothing less than full disclosure of what happened in Ibiza in 2017, as well as in and beyond 
the FPÖ’s innermost circles before and since. What this analysis reveals, however, is what 
Georg Simmel131 called in a different context an Außerdem: aside from what did or did not 
occur on and since Ibiza, the discussions analyzed above reveal old and new fault-lines, 
dynamics, antagonisms, boundaries (re)drawn and contested that both reflect and shape 
Austria today. My analysis has traced uneasily co-existing, at times outrightly competing, and 
themselves shifting discursive positions focused on Ibiza, the investigations and discussions 
triggered by the scandal. By following argumentative positions over a year, this article 
illuminates the competing performances that have been rewriting Austria’s political landscape 
since May 2019. The most prominent rhetorical performances have included Strache’s initial 
regret that soon turned into a self-ascribed “victim-cum-martyr-role”; the FPÖ’s gradual 
distancing and eventually seemingly irrevocable rupture from its former head; the Kronen 
Zeitung’s publicly performed – and in some quarters publicly doubted – ideological 
reorientation; the ÖVP’s boundary-drawing strategies vis-à-vis FPÖ (and SPÖ); and the 
recognition among critical commentators and parts of the opposition132 that Ibiza presented 
opportunities to shift dominant discourses (i.e. away from the renationalization represented by 
the former ÖVP-FPÖ coalition) and to call for structural changes. 
With the fall-out to the Ibiza-scandal far from settled, this may be the only thing we 
can say with certainty at the time of writing in June 2020: the events Ibiza triggered cast – 
when viewed through the Foucauldian lens applied in this article – new light on how political 
fields change in moments of crisis;133 this analysis has followed the competing voices, 
shifting concerns and rhetorical-argumentative positions adopted by multiple actors with 
stakes in the currently unfolding reconfiguration of the political field in question. 
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